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Puzzling Out Law's Person
DAVID WISHART*
ABSTRACT

How is the person to be conceptualized in law? Is it subject or object,
what is its ontology and teleology? These are old questions, but ones
newly raised by changing ideas of the province of the state, technology,
and the extension of legality. Examples include the protection of the fetus
in utero; contractualizationof relationships,including those of welfare;
the regulationof intimacy; the idea of government business; interventions
in the business of the firm; and challenges to legal entitihood as
constructing personhood. Much discussion of these is incommensurable
in terms of place, culture, and discipline. This article ventures a way of
thinking about law's person that renders such conversations possible.
This is to displace the person as central to the idea of law; rather, law
should be conceptualized as a discursive structure within a rationalityof
government. In this the legal person-and, indeed, the human being if
the analysis is taken further-are artefacts of techniques of governing.
The person thus seen is not a single concept but a variety of constructs of
particular programs of legal change. The contexts, differences and
similarities between them are rendered visible.
INTRODUCTION

The legal person is in trouble. It is now problematic, if ever it was
not, both as the subject and object of law, and in terms of both teleology
and ontology.
Notions formed on the cusp of the seventeenth century as to the role
Senior Lecturer, Law School, La Trobe University-Melbourne. This paper was written
for and presented at the Law in the Lighthouse Workshop on Seli Island, near Turku,
My thanks for many useful
Finland, under the auspices of Turku University.
contributions at that conference, especially from the convenor, Mika Viljanen. My thank
you to a generous reviewer who made me turn the whole thing upside down (not unusual,
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of law in the structure of society gave rise to the all-but-universal
modern assumption that human beings are the inevitable subjects of
law. Maintained in the face of the development of ideas of human rights,
later constitutionally reified, the liberal world order assumed the
essence of the human being as desiring freedom from government, and
thus being the object of law's force, yet struggling with the corporation
as determining a freedom from jurisdiction. The legal struggle did not
then reach the family although the emancipists sought to problematize
the family in society.
The neoliberal vision tied law's person to an idea of the individual as
reasonable, evaluating, and maximizing, only lately softened by
behavioral economics, though this still renders society's actions
calculable. Freedom is then defined by the capacity to hold property and
contract about it; one's preferences in transactions about property freely
entered into is its expression. Prior conflicts about the corporation's
subjectivity dissolve in the face of the transactional foundations of the
economics of the firm, although legality still hangs to the legal
personality of corporations. Economics had only analysis, not an answer,
to what comprised that personality.
Within neoliberalism the subject of regulation is the legal construct
deriving from neoliberalism's idea of the human being. The object of
regulation is less coherent; the market as the expression of freedom is a
matter of buyers and sellers, each hypothesized as consumer-person and
seller-firm respectively, regulation itself often conceived of as making
the market work.
Caught up in this whirl of conceptualizations are a series of
conundrums, some still reflecting the issues of the liberal era, but others
newly raised by changing ideas of the province of the state, technology,
and the extension of legality. They include the protection of the fetus in
utero; contractualization of relationships, including those of welfare; the
regulation of intimacy; the idea of government business; interventions
in the business of the firm; and challenges to legal entitihood as
constructing personhood.
This essay sets out the challenges faced by legal personhood. It
shows how discussion has been rendered futile by overriding notions of
subjectivity. It then ventures analyses and ways of thinking that again
make critical legal discussion possible.
I. CHALLENGES

A. The Human Being
That human beings are the subjects of law is seldom challenged. Of
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course this can be extended to corporations or generalized by reference
to the capacity of volition. Infants, the insane, and sometimes prisoners
may be subtracted from the total1 . Nevertheless, there is a perception
that ultimately human beings are what is regulated by law. It is,
however, just an assumption.
In terms of Australian law, a child of English law, it is arguable that
the critical point at which the human being was accepted as the subject
of law was as late as the seventeenth century, in The Case of Sutton's
Hospital.2 Given that this was a century and a half before the American
Revolution, it is probably good authority3 in the United States of
America as well. Nowadays we mainly cite the case for Lord Coke's
statement that "the corporation itself is only in abstracto,and rests only
in the intendment and consideration of the law; for a corporation
aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment
and consideration of the law." This is taken to be an authoritative
statement that there is no such thing as corporate personality apart
from the human beings comprising it4 but that the law can construct the
fiction of its existence.
By reporting the case, Lord Coke expressed a desire to set out the
law as to persons clearly and comprehensively. The context of the case
can provide a clue as to why he would want to do so. The early
seventeenth century lay at the tail end of feudalism. The liberal era was
1. See the discussion in respect of prisoners' right to vote in Roach v Electoral
Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 175-80, per Gleeson CJ; see in particular the
nineteenth century view of the matter in THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 94-95 (7th ed. 1842) (footnotes omitted). For UK and Canadian
perspectives of the same issue, see Belczowski v The Queen [1991] 3 FC 151; [1992] 2 FC
440; Sauve v Canada (Attorney-General; [1993] 2 SCR 438; Sauve v Canada (Chief
Electoral Officer) [2002] 3 SCR 519.
2. Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.); 10 Co. Rep. 23a; see id. at
973.
3. See, e.g., Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Ore. Ins. Guar.Ass'n, 136 P.3d 49, 57 (Ore.
Ct. App.2006)
4. The issue for the Court was whether something apart from the governors was
necessary for incorporation. Disappointed heirs were seeking to challenge a bequest to a
charitable institution, a school and a hospital by claiming inter alia that company could
not exist without something tangible more. There was no foundation, no hospital and no
Master (CEO) at the time of the issue of the Letters Patent of incorporation. They argued
They lost.
that therefore the incorporation failed and hence the bequest failed.
Interestingly, the reporter (Lord Coke) says of the arguments, 'Which brief report I have
made of these objections, because I think them, or the greater part of them, were not
worthy to be moved at the Bar, nor remembered at the bench; and that this case was
adjourned to the Exchequer-Chamber by the Justices of the King's Bench more for the
weight of the value than the difficulty of the law in the case." Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 24a-b. In other words, the case had a purpose that was more declaratory than law
formulation.
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to come. In Great Britain, Lord Coke's towering legal intellect
dominated this period. He formulated, in a series of other cases, 5 a new
constitutional structure at the center of which was the common law. 6
This required him, in turn, to formulate how the common law governs.
Lord Coke clearly saw law as governing the subjects of the Crown: this
is enunciated in Calvin's Case.7 However this leaves institutions as
nonsubjects. They are rendered invisible in the law. However, it was
obvious that collective institutions were very important to the smooth
running of the state. Lord Coke proceeded to allow corporations a place
amongst the governed and hence the governable but only as a figment of
legal imagination.
The Case of Sutton's Hospital,8 on this reading, is more about
establishing human beings as the subject of law than about deciding
anything about corporations. Yet there was no necessity for human
beings to be the sole subject of law. It may now be hard to conceive
otherwise, but Gierke showed us how, at least in Maitland's
translation9 : we could have looked for the capacity for volition and
recognized it elsewhere. Or we could have developed the path to which
we are called by the contumacious cockerel or the Hindu idollo; as
Stoljar recognizes, the separate pool of assets as the subject of law fits
many situations comfortably." Perhaps, although it is even harder to
imagine, law need not have a subject on which to operate.
If the subject of law is determined by law, as indeed any argument
for the supremacy of law must concede, there is no technical difficulty in
5. See, e.g., Proclamations, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 74; Dr.
Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.); 8 Co. Rep. 107 a.; Calvin's Case, (1608) 77
Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a.; Prohibitions Del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342
(K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 64.
6. This is, of course, not to say that Lord Coke's vision became the constitutional
structure nor that it was uncontested. After all, he was sacked from judicial offices
precisely for advocating it. See William Houdsworth, Sir Edward Coke, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
332, 334-45 (1935). Yet his vision of the common law remains substantially intact and that
is the relevant point here.
7. Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a.
8. Case of Sutton's Hospital,(1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.); 10 Co. Rep. 23 a.
9. S. J. SToLiAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY INTO CORPORATE THEORY 184-85

(1973).
10. For the former, see G. W. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE 149 (2d ed. 1949). As for the latter, see Exodus 21:28; Pramatha Nath
Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) L.R. 52 Ind. App. 245 (India). This is not to
mention the beetles of St. Julien-de-Maurienne tried and executed in 1545: E.P. EVANS,
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 37-8 (1906). See also,
for the same idea in theory rather than practice, Plato, Laws, 873(e)-874(a) (trial of
"lifeless things" for homicide; remedy is to cast guilty thing beyond borders of city).
(Thanks to an editor for this erudite point.).
11. See STOLJAR, supra note 9, at 10.
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law intervening in the nature of human beings. It does so when defining
what a legal person is, and in regulating its inception or even
conception. Having defined the legal person it may accept or adapt the
definition for various purposes. However, it also must locate those
definitions against the corporeal human being as that which comprises
society and as that on which economic and social forces operate. A
number of recent debates highlight the consequential problematics.
One controversy is over what is locally called "Zoe's Law." This
currently is a Parliamentary Bill in New South Wales (a State of
Australia). 12 It attempts to criminalize harm to unborn late-term fetuses
by declaring a fetus of over twenty weeks or weighing more than four
hundred grams a "legal person" for the purposes of dangerous-driving
crimes. 13 The complex issues of recognition of grieving, consistent
treatment of unborn fetuses, and connectedness of mother and child
illustrate the point that definitions may vary for purposes, that "legal
person" is not a fixed category but neither is "human being," and that
ethical and moral choices abound. These are, of course, exactly the
issues involved in any abortion law reform and have been discussed for
centuries.
A further debate, again an old one familiar to all property lawyers,
arose recently in the question of whether a human breast- or ovariancancer-disposing gene could be patented. The Full Court of the Federal
Court of Australia decided that it could. 14 The Supreme Court of the
United States has decided otherwise, 15 as has the High Court of
Australia. 16 What a legal person is comprised of is thus declared to be
possible of legal determination. Propertizing a part of a body is not
incommensurable with legal subjectivity, although it may be precluded
in various jurisdictions.
Many of these issues are rolled, together with questions of the
17
regulation of sexuality, into the notion of "intimate citizenship."' This
notion interrogates personal and intimate relationships as a matter of a

12. Crimes Amendment (Zoe's Law) Bill 2013 (No. 2).
13. See Hannah Robert, Why Losing My DaughterMeans I Don't Support Zoe's Law,
THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 17, 2013, 3:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-losing-mydaughter-means-i-dont-support-zoes-law-19985; see also Hannah Robert, The Bereavement
Gap: Grief, Human Dignity and Legal Personhoodin the Debate Over Zoe's Law, 22 J. L. &
MED. 319, 326 (2014).
217-19 (Austl.).
14. D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc. (2014) 224 FCR 479,
15. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119
(2013).
16. D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2015] HCA 35 (Austl.).
17. See KEN

PLUMMER,

INTIMATE

CITIZENSHIP: PRIVATE DECISIONS AND PUBLIC

DIALOGUES (2003) (arguing that intimate citizenship
conceptualizing the debates over regulation of the personal).

is

a

useful
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citizenship of choices; thus addressing "intimate troubles and choices"
around new forms of publicly recognized "family life"; sexuality;
genders; technologically-assisted reproduction; the use of medical
technologies and drugs to transform the body; and a growing array of
unacceptable approaches to intimacy. Thus, questions of the regulation
of intimate citizenship and of the representations and public discourse
about intimate citizenship influence the law and legal institutions,
including those problematizing the person as the subject of law.
More generally, the concept of state citizenship constructs
membership of society as a category distinct from legal personality. In
Australia the persecution of refugees has reached unimaginable heights
as societal membership is reified in terms of cultural homogeneity.18
Predictable already in 1985,19 it appears that such practices are
legitimated by the disconnect between protection and obedience and the
shattering of notions of belonging into multiple categories in which
social contract visions of the state do not obtain.
These observations of the nature of the human being as envisaged in
law illustrate a fractured relationship. The human being as subject of
law does not have a definitive status. The next section illustrates that
neither does the subject of law as human being. Other things can be
legal persons. Even relationships, considered in the following section,
are conceived in abstract terms only remotely perceivable from outside
law.
B. Nonhuman Legal Persons
Collectivities have long been recognized in legal systems. AngloAmerican accounts of the history of corporations law mostly start with
the towns and guilds of England well prior to, but culminating in, the
above-mentioned Case of Sutton's Hospital. This genealogy is seriously
misleading in a number of respects. First, it does not recognize the
experience of thousands of years of global commercial exchange and
hence of commercial organization. Second, it confines the developments
to England when much the same sorts of things were happening across,

18. For the background to the incarceration of refugees in Australia and the refusal to
allow "boat people" entry, see generally PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
PERSONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION (Angus Francis & Rowena Maguire eds., 2013);
ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MIGRATION LAW, THEORY AND POLICY (Satvinder S.
Juss ed., 2013); ASYLUM SEEKERS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERDICTION AND
DETERRENCE (Alperhan Babacan & Linda Briskman eds., 2008); FORCED MIGRATION,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY (Jane McAdam ed., 2008).
19. See, e.g., David A. Wishart, Allegiance and Citizenship as Concepts in
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 662, 666-67 (1986).
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at least, Europe. When the account is extended territorially and
temporally, it becomes obvious that the themes in corporations law
today are mere continuations of local responses to issues that have
plagued commerce for as long as money has existed. How to avoid being
cheated yet organize to accommodate both capital provision and labor
contribution; how to spread risk, to raise funds, to share in ownership
and to trade in ownerships; and how to transact when there are
multiple owners are all problems apparent in the evidence we have of
life more than one thousand years ago.
The history of the legal form of association is long. In the Corpus
20
Juris Civilis, various forms of commercial association were recognized.
In the Byzantine and Islamic empires, various forms of partnership and
commenda developed as matters of institutionalized commercial
practice. 21 In feudal society, crown law was not the only legal system.
Ecclesiastical organizations and offices operated autonomously, as to a
lesser extent did towns and guilds. The autonomous bodies, especially
towns and guilds, recognized the military dominance of the crown by
rendering taxes on behalf of their populations in return for recognition
of their self-government and exemption from dues payable to local
feudal lords. 22 Crown law increasingly subsumed these legal systems by
recognizing individual autonomy. It nominated the institutions'
"corporations." From this the present assumed position of collectivities
as the subject and object of a universal state law developed.
The collectivity as legal subject is thus also constructed, although
law itself ebbs and flows in its regard for the internal workings of
corporations as outside its jurisdiction. A high point was reached in the
late nineteenth century in this use of the word "jurisdiction." Another
intriguing example is the New Zealand case of Trevor Ivory Ltd. v
Anderson, where the court thought that if the sole owner of a one-person
23
company did something, the company did it, not the person.
Nevertheless in no era is the law thought incapable of regulating
internal workings; directors' duties, and accounting and audit
requirements are cases in point. The Dutch central bank's intervention
in the behavior and culture of financial institutions by undertaking risk
assessments of employees and boards founded in psychology represents

20. See generally, P. W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1938), for a
description of Roman conceptions of association and personality.
21. John H. Pryor, The Origins of the Commenda Contract 52 (1) SPECULUM 5 (1977).
22. See C.A COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY (1950); see also RONALD
FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY LAw (1923).

23. See Trevor Ivory Ltd. v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517, 524 (CA).
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a more extreme example. 24 More recently economics literature has
persuaded many lawyers that the corporation itself is simply a nexus of
contracts between human beings with personality, simply a means of
25
implementing default terms.
While such considerations might persuade that the corporation as
legal person is disaggregated into various statuses and regulations
made possible by categorization of various functions undertaken by
human actors, even technologically enhanced ones, other trends are
apparent. In particular it is arguable that the corporate form is being
homogenized and deployed to represent a wider range of collectivities
and institutions. This is achieved through imposed structural change
where feasible, taxation incentives, legal conveniences and protections,
and managerial greed. Thus, universities are pulled out of the peculiar
category of educational institution and reconstructed as businesses
competing for students and research dollars. So also are processes to
enable the demutualization of insurance companies and other social
institutions. Government businesses are corporatized and privatized,
although there is no convincing rationale for the distinction between
"government activity" and "government business." 26
24. See generally Mirea Raajimakers, Supervisory Approach and Methodology, in DE
NEDERLANDScHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOUR AND CULTURE: FOUNDATIONS,
PRACTICE & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 64 (2015).
25. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415 (1989); David Wishart, A Reconfiguration of
Company and/or Corporate Law Theory, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 151, 166-71 (2010); David
A. Wishart, Arguing Against the Economics of (Say) CorporationsLaw, 26 UNIV. N.S.W.
L.J. 540, 560-61 (2003). See generally Nicolai J. Foss et al., The Theory of the Firm, in III
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMIcs 631, 636 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000).
26. See generally Harold Seidman, The Government Corporation: Organization and
Controls, 14 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 183, 183-84 (1954) (containing the seemingly only
discussion of distinguishing between government activity and government business on the
following criteria:
1.
the government is dealing with the public as a businessman rather than a sovereign;
2.
users, rather than the general taxpayer, are to pay for the cost of goods and services;
3.
expenditures necessarily fluctuate with consumer demand and cannot be predicted
accurately or realistically kept within annual limitations;
4.
expenditures to meet increased demand should not, in the long run, increase the net
outlay from the treasury; and
5.
operations are being conducted within areas in which there are well established
commercial trade practice).
On the other hand, there is considerable work classifying institutions and also identifying
issues in government organizations, such as accountability and responsibility. See
generally Margaret Allars, Private Law but Public Power: Removing Administrative Law
Review from Government Business Enterprises, 6 PUB. L. REV. 44, 52-55 (1995) (defining
the scope of corporate responsibility under the Australian Freedom of Information Act);
Roger Wettenhall, Corporations and Corporatisation: An Administrative History
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At the same time as corporations are disaggregated, corporations
law constructing the legal person is being taken to have wider impact
than simply on the capacity of corporations to conduct their business. In
the United Kingdom, the scope of family law to intervene in the
workings of companies has been confined on the basis that family law
orders as to corporate property could not override the separateness of
27
United
that property from that of the partners to the marriage. In the
28
case 29 extend30
Lobby
Hobby
the
and
States, the Citizens United case
the protection afforded by constitutional rights, drawing a closer
relation with human beings in conflict with disaggregation tendencies.
Legal persons as something other than human beings, especially as
aggregates of human beings, thus illustrate the same logical
incoherence, even incommensurability of thinking, as the human being
as legal person. Severing the direct link between human being and legal
person does not provide solutions to the challenge.
C. Relationships
As adverted to above, one of the most significant features of legal
change in the new millennium is the contractualization of relationships.
Again it is hardly a new phenomenon: in 1861 Henry Maine identified it
as the movement from status to contract. Yet it presently takes on
heightened forms.
If the categories of human beings' relations with the state are
multiple and contingent, and the category of "legal person" forms a
number of differing formulations of those relations, the advent of
neoliberalism or economic rationalism 31 has led to a debate about
Perspective, 6 PUB. L. REV. 12-21 (1995) (describing the need for accommodation amongst
government organizations to respond to changing environments); Michael Taggart,
Corporatisation,Privatisationand Public Law, 2 PUB. L. REV. 77 (1991) (explaining how
the State-Owned Enterprises Act carefully distinguished between "responsibility" and
"accountability"); Stephen Bottomley, Government Business Enterprises and Public
Accountability Through Parliament (Dep't of the Parliamentary Library, Research Paper
No. 18 1999-2000, Apr. 11, 2000).
27. See Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34. A similar decision was made by the
High Court of Australia in Ascot Invs. Pty. Ltd. v Harper(1981) 148 CLR 337. The latter
was reversed by legislation in 2003, but this encouraged the avoidance of third-party debts
through separation agreements. That in turn was dealt with by enlarging the jurisdiction
of courts in bankruptcy proceedings.
28. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
29. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
30. Beyond that of the due process clause: exparte Young, 2019 U.S. 123 (1908).
31. This mentality is variously also known as micro-economic reform, the Washington
consensus, economic fundamentalism, industrial market structure reform, and, depending
on the country, Thatcherism (U.K.), Reaganomics (U.S.), or Rogernomics (N.Z.). It is

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

23:2

contractualization of human relationships. In a narrow form, this is
about the provision of welfare services conceived of as contract, the
consideration for which is the recipients' adjustment of themselves to
being suitable members of society. It includes work for the dole schemes,
training and requirements to learn how to apply, even governance of
indigenous peoples. 32 The relation of recipient to the state is imagined
as one of free contracting under which the state is free to withhold
welfare. The idea, "mutual obligation," is touted as a "Third Way"
between neoliberalism and social welfarism. The debate is whether
mutual obligation denies citizenship.3 3
While mutual obligation can be viewed as deploying an empowering
strategy, whereby the citizenship of the welfare recipient is
acknowledged in ways not accommodated by the welfare state, equally it
can be understood as the naked exercise of coercive power. More
theoretically, contractualism generally, as much as its sibling
liberalism, presupposes the individual as some sort of ontological
essence, an essence readily denied through the discussion above about
the fracturing of assumed coexistence of legal person and human being.
At a practical level, this plays out as contractualism's insistence on the
exercise of citizenship only through transactions and its corresponding
difficulty with those who do not fit into the realm of reasonable,
evaluating maximizers of personal utility. Thus, for example, the
intellectually disabled are treated as parties to welfare provisions
constructed as contractual by virtue of some form of agency, yet this
clearly is as problematic as the consent of the citizens in Rousseau's
republic.3 4 Further, people are presumed to choose in all spheres of their

beyond the scope of this article extensively to discuss these permutations of the era we live
in.
32. See Peter Yeend, Mutual Obligation/Work for the Dole, AUSTRALIAN
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY (Nov. 27, 2000), http://www.aph.gov.au/AboutParliament/
ParliamentaryDepartments/ParliamentaryLibrary/PubhcationsArchive
/archive/dole;
REFERENDUM

COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION

OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES

STRAIT ISLANDER PEOPLES (2015), available at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default
files/publications/communique_14_dec_2015.pdf.
33. See generally THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM? (Glyn Davis et al. eds., 1997);
Contractualismand Citizenship, 18 L. CONTEXT 8 (2001) (expounding on the concept of
new contractualism as an alternate to the traditional dichotomy of neoliberalism and
social welfarism).
34. See Anna Yeatman, Contract, Status and Personhood, in THE NEW
CONTRACTUALISM 39, supra note 33; Judy Cashmore, Children: ContractualNon-Persons?,
in THE NEW CONTRACTUALISM 57, supra note 33. Yeatman and Cashmore accept that the
contract state assumes the capacity to choose, but argue that the state, in so doing,
empowers persons to act within the state, and that a task of the state is to enhance this.
See Yeatman, supra note 34, at 45-54; Cashmore, supra note 34, at 59-68. My answer,
coming partially out of the experience of parenthood, would be that there are limits to
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life no matter that many matters are about the process of choosing ("I
choose to have that decision made by my partner/the state/my tribe") or
that in their milieu some spheres are not governed in that way: do we
choose with whom to fall in love?35 Contractualism also refuses any idea

of a group as contracting party, 36 making its application to agreements
with the peoples, mobs, tribes, bands, or iwi of indigenous peoples
decidedly problematic. 37 It also assumes that the state has something to
offer, that it is the state that owns the welfare (or native title) that is
handed over. Behind this is a complex of intersecting ideas of the
government and of the nature of income streams. These include that the
society 38 and that the state is free to
government is separate from 39
arrogate to itself from property.

such enhancement, that such enhancement falls into the realm of wishful thinking, even
more so in fields other than welfare, and that liberal individual empowerment implies
expanded self-interest and this works more detrimentally in the necessarily partial
empowerment suggested by "enhancement."

35. See Robert D. Mare, Five Decades of EducationalAssortative Mating, 56 AM. SOC.
REV. 15-18 (1991) (arguing that educational attainment is an indicator of quality); see also
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 108-34 (enlarged ed. 1991) (arguing that
men and woman of high quality (sic) are matched). It should be noted that,
epistemologically, these theories do not actually give access to the choices of a choosing
individual: the formulae derived are about predicting conduct, not about the nature of
choice. Indeed, defining away the subjective nature of choice in order to render choices
calculable is the point of such theories. The same answer can be made to behavioural
economics.

36. See generally David A Wishart, Arguing Against the Economics of (Say)
Corporations Law, 26 UNIV. N.S.W. L.J. 540 (2003) (critiquing the attempt to include
corporations within neoliberal theory).

37. David A. Wishart, Contract, Oppression and Agreements with Indigenous Peoples,
28 UNIV. N.S.W. L.J. 780, 799 n.77 (2005) See also the debate over the constitutional
recognition of indigenous peoples in Australia, where the debate over representation is
implicit in Commonwealth of Australia, Parliament, Joint Select Committee on
Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Final Report
33-38. The appointment of a Referendum Council by the Government was announced on 7
December 2015: Referendum Council, Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Peoples, Communique, 14 December 2015 (available at < http://www.dpmc.
gov.aulsites/default/files/publications/communique_14_dec_2015.pdf> accessed 29 January
2016).
38. See Mitchell Dean & Barry Hindess, Introduction: Government, Liberalism, Society,
in GOVERNING AUSTRALIA: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 1,
5-6 (Mitchell Dean & Barry Hindess eds., 1998).

39. See C. B. Macpherson, Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property, in
AND BEYOND 104, 120-24 (Eugene Kamenka & R. S. Neale eds.,

FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM,

1975).
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II. THE PROBLEM
The discussion above illustrates that law itself is failing its own
ideals of consistency and coherence, and is becoming remote from
societal understandings of the individual. The latter is rendered even
more problematic if the Foucauldian idea of the constructed nature of an
individual's social subjectivity is accepted. To do so renders contingent
the notion of individual subjectivity. The ontological being of humans,
assumed above, is refused.
If law is considered a hermeneutic system, operating on legal
subjects through rights and obligations, of which individuals take
advantage or not, and with which they do or do not comply, there is no
need of connections to human society. That is a reasonable approach for
the doctrinal scholar or the practitioner. However, as the discussion
above reveals, the simple normative framework of consistency and
coherence does not rationally resolve the challenges. 40 Some alternative
framework of reasoning needs to be applied if the social human being
and the legally assumed subject of law are to be normatively connected,
perhaps as facets of the same thing, under which change in
understandings of one impacts on the other. The task is to work out how
discussions of these relationships can take place when one view is blind
to the other.

III. A WAY OF THINKING VENTURED
Misusing "governmentality" is here ventured as one way of thinking
and speaking about one's observations of law, policy, and appurtenant
theory, in this case about the legal person. The way of thinking is a
misuse for reasons discussed below. "Governmentality" derives from
brief comments and a title in the later phase of Foucault's sociology. 41 In
this, "governmentality" is referred to as the rationality (not analysis) of
government viewed in terms of the techniques for the management of
individuals in populations. Hence, "governmentality" refers to a specific
and complex form of power, comprising its institutions, procedures,

40. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURIsMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW, 60-61 (1998)

(arguing that cases are settled when outcomes are predictable; that, by definition, if the
outcome of a dispute is not predictable, there is no rational reason for either side to win,
hence the law in that situation is irrational).
41. See especially Mitchell Dean, GOVERNMENTALITY : POWER AND RULE IN MODERN

SOCIETY, (1999); P.Miller and N. Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 1(1990). Its origins lie in M. Foucault, Governmentality, in G. Burchell, C.
Gordon and P. Miller (eds.) THE FOUCAULT EFFECT. STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (1991)

87.
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analyses, and tactics, with its target being the population and its
principle sources of knowledge being political economy. The technical
means in this formulation are the apparatuses of security. This is not a
question of state power; rather it means the state is embedded in the
ways of thinking of society.
So much is apparent from Foucault's writings. One could even say,
"Foucault ends here." 42 Later writers have tended to write about the
location of these ideas within Foucault's thought, perhaps with
additions. What results is a complex way of thinking; we have to be
wary of calling it an analysis because to do so implies that something
else is being analyzed: that there is a separation between the analysis
and the thing to which it is applied, the relation between them being
that of abstraction. In a context where knowledge and power are in a
dyadic relation, to separate out knowledge from the thing being known
is to deny that knowledge creates the thing in terms of what that thing
means: the branch in the forest may fall unheard, and that may be an
aspect of the physical world, but it has no existence in the world of the
intellect until it is known to fall. Governmentality is a way of thinking
that we participate in, that imbues and constructs us. In it we think of
doing things to govern.
In the present context, then, an appreciation of governmentality
directs the focus to what was done, and what expertise existed in which
knowledge produced a field of intervention, and apparatuses of security
and surveillance. Most importantly, the individual's sense of self is
produced by knowledge; hence space is given to the production of the
citizen not least through techniques of the self, implying investigating
the relation of the inner being to outer behavior and, further, what
regulation might mean for that relation. This enables quite radical
expansions of the analytical field, yet, importantly for the current
project, removes the subject from its erstwhile position as the
fundamental unit of analysis, a black hole with impenetrable event
horizons. Further, the state or the government is not a separate focus at
all. Certainly, actions of (in Westminster terms) parliament, cabinet, the
prime minister, the executive, even the judiciary, are considered, but
always in terms of the empowering knowledge constituting them. This
is the sense of the word "governing."
A notion of "technique of governance" makes possible the
abandonment of the state, the law, and the subject. They are, according
to governmental ways of thinking, simply intellectual constructs of
empowering knowledges. Governing, from this perspective, is the
exercise of power within society without implying any institution as

42. Pace, my referee.
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vague as "the state," any necessary centrality for law, or assuming any
specific formulation of the individual's inner being. If exercises of power
are made possible by ways of knowing, and the language and patterns of
thought within the community, we can term them "techniques" and
include those whereby we govern ourselves. Thus, if there is expertise in
43
probability, we accept ideas of risk and govern ourselves to reduce it. If
we conceive of property and money value, we may accept prices as
determined by markets as the means by which resources are allocated
to us and rationing by price as governing us. In similar ways rulemaking is accepted-not only are rules internalized in the community
but also acceptance of rules and institutions of rule-making. 44 In this
way, individuals and groups are both empowered and constrained. In
many respects they govern themselves. Power is constrained and
limited by the forms of acceptable rule-making. Those forms are the
"techniques of governance." Making law governing "subjects" is just one
such technology.
However, even as set out recently, 45 governmentality does not
comprehend certain ideas and expressions met in the exploration of law.
Moreover, how certain things often referred to are to be thought of, such
as institutions, procedures, and techniques, needs to be made apparent.
Just as Foucault himself needed to set out matters fully in his studies of
the prison 46 and of sex, 47 so the whole structure of policy-formation and
implementation must be knowable before the subject itself can be
described. 48 Finally, it is all very well to talk of techniques of
43. Extensively discussed in PAT O'MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND GOVERNMENT,
(2004), ch 1.
44. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-120 (1961) (expounding the point of
positivists' "rule of recognition").
45. Supra note 41. See also Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, FOUCAULT AND LAW:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 6-7 (1994).
46. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1979).

47. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1981-88).
48. This is true also of this study and raises a major implication of proceeding down
the line ventured in this article. How were the enumerated challenges observed? What
made them noticeable? Why are they about the subject of law? Ever since Kant, and Hume
before him, it is conventional that there can be no observation without a theory. De
Certeau talks of the inevitable abstraction of the map. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE
PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 91-130 (Steven Rendall trans., 2011). It is beyond the
province of this article to explore how the inevitability of a constituting discourse might be
dealt with; suffice it for now to simply refer to legal anthropology and ethnography, and to
advocate a form of thick description with reflexivity, drawing on the work of Clifford
Geertz. E.g. Marilyn Strathern, Afterword: Accountability... and Ethnography, in AUDIT
CULTURES: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN ACCOUNTABILITY, ETHICS AND THE ACADEMY

279 (Marilyn Strathern ed., 2000); Sally Wheeler, Capital Fractionalized: The Role of
Insolvency Practitioners in Asset Distribution, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 85 (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds.,
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government, but jurisprudence would claim a special place for law. The
rule of law claims to regulate society, and, at least in civil law countries,
the feature of law it provides is its structuration. Weber placed this at
the center of his understanding, 49 and jurisprudence generally separates
law from society.
By contrast, governmentality was long thought to relegate law to a
minor place. Foucault's injunction to "Cut off the King's head" is
frequently cited to this effect. Yet even within Foucault's schema, law is
a medium of power, not a principle of power. It is a continuous
regulatory and corrective mechanism constituted by reference to the
object of regulation: a framework of norms established through
observation and knowledge, then applied to the objects it seeks to
govern. In that sense it is self-referential. Further, law has no
fundamental characteristic and, being constituted by power, cannot
itself limit power. Hence, in a postmonarchical era, sovereignty has to
be rethought.
Accordingly, a governmentality approach does not assume
consistency or coherence, or any supervening characteristic or special
place for law. Relevant here, the human being (and even property) is
removed from its central position. Consistency, coherence, or system are
not assumed: doctrine is a construct of a certain ideology about law. The
emphasis is on law as a technique-law as one technology amongst
many directed at the population.
IV.

THINKING ABOUT THE SUBJECT

At this point, the way of thinking set out above can be extended so
as to encompass the challenges outlined earlier in this article. If the
norms of law are the practices observed to exist, as constituted by legal
knowledge and jurisprudence, the things which are done, and the
actions that are taken, are the object of attention. Thus, parliament
makes laws through a series of actions summarized as "legislation."
Courts resolve disputes, leaving judgments to be systematized by
1994); Sally Wheeler, The Business Enterprise: A Socio-Legal Introduction, in A READER
ON THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 1 (Sally Wheeler ed., 1994); Neil Andrews,
Information in Late Capitalism Illustrated:The MBO of Elders XL, 6 CANBERRA L. REV.
77 (1999). See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive
Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD
GEERTZ 3 (1973); SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH
32-53 (1978) (developing the idea that the semi-autonomous social field is the relevant
heuristic device).
49. For example, Max Weber Three Types of Legitimate Rule (Die drei reinen Typen der
legitimen Herrschaft tr Hans Gerth) 4(1) BERKELEY PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIETY AND
INSTITUTIONS 1 (1958).
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subsequent judges, academics, and practitioners, so constructing case
law. The norms of law, in this perspective, are not something that can
be directly studied or known; it is only the evidence of their making or
the trace of their passing that can be seen. This is, of course and
ironically, the seminal positivist H.L.A. Hart's point: that we should not
ask "What is?" questions. 50
Such an approach views some issues in jurisprudential and legal
thinking in ways quite at variance with alternative, conventional
approaches. 51 For example, as adverted to above, the question of
coherence and consistency is subordinated. Inconsistent practices are
simply something that is observed. That the practice, even when
nominated legal, is inconsistent with some other practice may be a
criticism of either practice, and someone-say a judge or a parliamentinvolved in those practices may deal with the consequent issues one way
or another by reconciling them, or resolving the contradiction by
choosing one approach over another. However, it does not mean it is
impossible to think of the practices as inconsistent. Resistance and
change may result from inconsistencies and incoherence, but these
possibilities do not mean that governmental thinking is not in place. 52
Policy-makers, governments, members of the executive, and lawyers
generally may well accept law as a discrete hermeneutic system, with
an entirely unproblematic concept of sovereignty and of the subject.
Those living and operating within the legal system may well adhere for
that purpose to an entirely self-consistent rationality (and abandon it
when caught for speeding on the way home). This then, pace Foucault,
enables law to limit power when it is constituted by the same
governmental power. Interpretation of provinces of authority may be the
mechanism; the classical doctrines of separation of power then apply.
Indeed,
a
governmental
rationality
can
coexist
with
constitutionalism. In the conflicts of ways of thinking, resistance and
change occur, as Foucault illustrates in his extensive histories of

50. See H. L. A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37, 37
(1954).
51. It is, however, surprisingly similar to realist approaches, and many realist
aphorisms apply quite well. The difference is the government of the self: that the self is
constructed by the powers of normalisation. Realism presumes the individual to be.
52. See generally Gary Wickham, Foucault, Law, and Power: A Reassessment, 33 J.L. &
SOC'Y 596 (2006). Critique, like the law, is localized within the system of knowledge and
language. Hence Gary Wickham's renunciation of governmentality, because it diminishes
the rule of law when that rule is desperately needed, is misguided. To be sure, the rule of
law is no longer the absolute value Dicey might take it to be (Albert Venn Dicey AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, ch 4 (1885), yet that is

not to say that ethics and values are not essential to the functioning of society. Wickham
needs a dose of Habermas--probably a sense of "purpose" would help too.
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sexuality and discipline noted above, but also as illustrated by de
Certeau in the power of everyday life. 53 In these conflicts Foucault's own
observations are realized-de Certeau's "edge experience"-and so we
can meet Habermas's challenge that Foucault uses rationality to deny
reason.
Exploring the way governmental thinking operates in the everyday
life of the legal system demonstrates both how the conventional legal
apparatus can be thought and how internal professional thinking may
discipline actors, challenging governmental discourse. This provides a
way of understanding and locating the person against legal personality.
Law is an integral part of it, yet policy often is effected through law, and
law constitutes policy and policy-makers. Law and other governmental
techniques operate within, and are of, a governmental rationality; but
other techniques, those based perhaps on market or evolutionary forces,
may challenge them.
Both the human being and the legal person are thus artefacts of
techniques of governing. How, then, do we say what is right when the
notions conflict? This is the conundrum at the core of the challenges to
legal personality set out above. Evaluation is abjured by Foucault and
54
disciples; it is at this that Habermas directs his most cogent criticism:
How else are we to know what to do? Is what we have done right?
The conventional postmodern answer is that awareness and
knowledge bring the possibility of change, although to undertake
evaluation itself is to have an ontology, the predicate of any analysis.
The pragmatic answer here is that this may be so, but it may not, and it
is up to the reader to decide. In any event, awareness and knowledge
are as much an evaluation as anything else: the choosing between
courses of action and the grounds for so choosing are merely left to
others-the possibility of change is one thing and deciding what to do is
another; at some point action is needed. Not to proceed to evaluation is
cowardice, an unwillingness to reveal oneself: the process is of
Habermas's discourse ethics, even Latour's reading of Stenger's
cosmopolitics, and it is in this way that society can better itself. In the
interventions we make in the discussions about the world we would like
to live in, it is better that we are not like Latour's Spaniards and
Amerindians, with alternative worldviews, if not physical worlds. 55

53. DE CERTEAU, supranote 48, at 91-130.
54. See generally TERRY EAGLETON, THE ILLUSIONS OF POSTMODERNISM 1-19 (1996)
(questioning critiques of, and arguments against, the concept of totality).
55. See Bruno Latour, Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics? Comments on the Peace
Terms of Ulrich Beck, 10 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 450, 451-52 (2004) (referring to Eduardo
Viveiros de Castro, Les pronoms cosmologiques et le perspectivisme amdrindien, in GILLE
DELEUZE: UNE VIE PHILOSOPHIQUE 429 (]ric Alliez ed., 1998)).
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Evaluation generally involves an assessment of effect. Yet even
effect is anathema to the Foucauldian principle: determination of effects
of action inevitably provokes an incommensurability issue. In Kantian
terms, results are dependent on the paradigm under which the
measurement takes place. 56 Evidence is theory-contingent.57 In terms of
techniques of government, the theory on which evidence is contingent
includes the conceptualization of that on which power is exercised,
including society, individuals, and institutions. The statement of an
effect depends on our way of knowing all these things. Nevertheless,
that there are effects of action is implied by acceptance of time and
consequence, and these can hardly be ignored. Moreover, that
hypothesis-testing is theory-contingent does not mean that effects do
not result; it merely means that that the contingency of their
measurement is open to speculation and analysis.
More to the point, if theorizing is to have any justification, the
justification would be that theorizing should lead to action in some
endeavour: to have effects. This is important in two ways. First, it
implies the complex relation between effect and purpose. Purpose
frequently decides what measurement of effect is to take place.
Unintended effects are acknowledged and identified. In this legitimacy
is often found. Legitimate action can then be said to be where the effects
are the ones intended. The reverse is often also the case: the purpose is
confined by the measurability of the effects. The expertise, which
identifies effects, allows the imagination of the purpose. For example,
the development of probability allowed the imagination of risk58
mitigation and, of course, vice versa.
The
second implication
is that theorizing
itself, even
metatheorizing, has purposes and effects. While I wish to avoid
plunging into the waters of the critique of representation by confining
the discussion to the expression of theorizing, it may be safely said that
the theorist acts by publishing words. The act of so doing has purposes
and effects which permeate the evidence of the existence of the text.
This applies to this article and also to others. Again, we cannot say with
certitude what any purpose is, nor what the effects of any particular
action will be, but this does not mean that those purposes and effects do
not exist. Moreover, if we are to talk of what is right, the critique of
effects is vitally important.
Action is often evaluated from perspectives outside dominant
56. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781)
57. See generally A.F. CHALMERS, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED SCIENCE? (3d ed. 1999);
MARTEN SHIPMAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (John Barron Mays & Maurice

Craft eds., 3d ed. 1988). Most history and philosophy of science texts discuss this point.
58. O'MALLEY, supra note 43.
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discourses. If there were an episteme,59 this might be inconceivable, yet
even when a prevailing discourse provides a calculable effect to
measure, alternlative discourses or resistance can throw up evaluative
frameworks. For example, human rights discourse can be deployed in
relation to the nooliberal individual. Of course, attempts are made to
incorporate the huhian rights framework, to reconstruct it, or render60it
meaningless-by conceiving of human rights as property, for example.
Coming around again to the legal subject, within the way of
thinking posited here, the individual is no longer necessarily "a
presocial self, a solitAry and sometimes heroic individual confronting
society, who is fully formed before the confrontation begins," as Walzer
sardonically puts it.61 The identity, capacity, desires, and status of
individuals in society ar6 shaped by institutions and bodies, themselves
the product of practiceg, techniques and, knowledge, not to forget
resistance .62
Given prevailing neoliberal rationalities, economic understandings
have been internalized. In all the various forms of economics,
individuals are somewhat elusive. They are not real persons but the
beings whose choices define happiness. Epistemology creates an
abstract being. The characteristics of this being are altered within
different approaches: unity of economic opinion is not claimed here as
some trope against which to fage-acceptance of a governmentality
approach does not argue against it. Indeed, within the governmentality
framework such a subject, or any formulation of them as a person, is
possible. They would be so as constructed by the mentality of
marketized techniques of government.
While accepting an economic epistemology as knowledge, and
acknowledging that exploration, expliration, and furtherance may make
the techniques of governance work better in some way, governmentality
would focus attention on the possibility of individuals who are invisible
or who are not counted-who are marrinalized in the microphysics of
power of such knowledge. Hence, for neoliberalism economic knowledge
is located in a context in which indiviluals are present and which
enables critique in terms of human subjectivity. This critique lies
outside, while acknowledging, economic epittemology.
1

59. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 197 (1980); see also THE ORDER OF

THINGS (TR) 168 (1970).
60. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melaned, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(conflating wrongs into property of one sort or another).
61. Michael Walzer, The CommunitarianCritique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 20
(1990).
62. See Dean & Hindess, supra note 38, at 2-12.
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CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT LEGAL PERSONALITY

The relation of legal subject to human being has been the subject of
discussion in jurisprudence for at least half a millennia. As noted at the
outset of this article, a contumacious cockerel and a Hindu idol have
both been tried as legal subjects. Indeed, and without restarting the
English Civil War, sovereignty was defined in terms of subjects as much
as territory. 63 Thus, in The Case of Sutton's Hospital,64 Lord Coke lit on
the human being as the subject of law, with exclusions (minors, women,
prisoners and so forth) and some inclusions (the cockerel, the idolalthough the idol came later). This left institutions problematic. If the
subjects of law are human beings, what are corporations, universities,
charities, the state, the crown-even tennis clubs or reading groups?
Lord Coke took the obvious step in relation to the matter before him:
"the corporation itself is only in abstracto, and rests only in the
intendment and consideration of the law ...,,65 Thereafter followed four
hundred years of explication of how law designed for human beings
works for institutions. There were some doubts, especially with regard
to corporations, 66 but no serious challenge to the proposition that law is
aimed at subject human beings. 67 Nevertheless, it was not a necessaryconclusion; it was merely the result of constructing a place for law in a
constitutional understanding of the state.
Imagining sovereignty dignifies legality as governance in which law
more or less takes human beings as its subject. Neoliberalism or other
mentalities of policy-formation are denied significance within this
picture on two grounds: law is part, but not the whole, of policy, and
policies may be directed at populations and institutions, not individuals.
Post-Foucauldian governmentality shifts the focus onto techniques of
government, of which sovereign law both as mentality and as process is
but one. Within this, mentalities of government, such as neoliberalism,
describe sets of techniques drawing on knowledges surrounding and
imbuing concepts, such as the idea of "competition," and directed at the
population, at institutions, and at ideas of both (the population as
consumer, for example). These techniques, strategies, and tactics may
exercise biopower on individuals or may exercise government of the self
63. See Proclamations, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 74; Dr. Bonham's
Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.); 8 Co. Rep. 107 a.; Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep.
377 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 1 a.; Prohibitions Del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B.); 12 Co.
Rep. 64.
64. Case of Sutton's Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.); 10 Co. Rep. 23 a.
65. Id. at 973.
66. See STOLJAR, supra note 9, at 184-85.
67. See Wishart, A Reconfiguration of Company and/or Corporate Law Theory, supra
note 25, at 151.
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by individuals. The individual may be the medium of power, that
through which power flows, but is not necessarily that at which
government is directed. A mentality imbues the population and
individuals by which these exercises of power are understood and acted
on. This understanding of society exposes far more of its processes than
simply to understand the individual as legal subject to be acted on by
laws, regulations, and rules.
Overall, then, the above provides a context in which to understand
the legal subject, the recasting of society's relations as transactions and,
indeed, the program of neoliberalism. But is it Governmentality? In
short, no. "Purpose" and "effect" are associated with functionalism and
structuralism-postmodernism would look at things like "control" and
"order." As one interlocuter 68 wrote,
the
deconstruct
would
good postmodernist
A
assumptions and rearrange things in a different order or
incorporate new elements. As I read your work - it is
still too structured. Get radical, challenge convention,
blur reality and then offer a tamed alternative remember there is no such thing as objective for a
postmodernist! It is all inter-subjectivity.
Yet, as we have seen, a move was necessary to achieve the object
here: critical evaluation of reconstructions of the idea of the subject of
law. When faced with the political (in the sense of governmental)
questions of whether we have done Good and what should we do, or
perhaps what world would we want to live in, retreat to description is
insufficient; ontologies and their multiple relationships to the object of
study must be discussed.
The shift undertaken here returns to that which Foucault started
with: the microphysics of power. Retreating back to Foucault's Hegelian
roots, reality is seen to be derived from consciousness and acknowledges
the Derridean point that the text in its many forms is all we have to
ground our understanding through its capacity to transmit meaning. 69
Structured (by Hegel) as the resulting approach might be, that structure
is contingent and remains open for discussion. The individual has been
displaced, allowing it-us-to be the product of our environment in the
way we perceive and think about the world. Law too has been displaced
from the central stage in government, allowing a much wider spectrum

68. My thanks to Angus Young for this comment, albeit on a different piece of
corporate theory. The approach was the same.
69. JAcQuEs DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 62-63 (1967).
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of actions (including simple knowledge creation) to be perceived as
government, and the state is fragmented into a panoply of institutions
and actors. The subject and whatever subjectivity it might possess is
constituted in a variety of ways. In the dissonances between these
constructions lies debate and possibility. The ontology of Zoe's Law can
be raised in the propertization of genes if we see them in their contexts
of processes and institutions. The dialectic of firm and corporation can
again be released from notions of the essence of personality, allowing a
place for metaphor rather than fiction. The contractual relation can be
seen to dictate ideas of person and property and evaluated as something
more than an expression of freedom.
This essay, then, speaks to a profound concern with a disjunction
between theory and observation, and between both and programs and
actions. Thinking in terms of law as a discursive structure within a
rationality of government, locating it as a governmental technique
amongst many, enables conversations from multiple perspectives about
what to do without incommensurability of analysis.
Deploying these techniques sees programs of legal change informing
and legitimating the observed construction of legal persons and
relations between them in various ways. To do so posits the possibility
of other natures of institutions and human beings with which the legal
person is intimately associated. In the articulation of the
interrelationship between them lies the possibility of action and the
resolution of the challenges to the notion of legal personality.

